Ockham explains, in the Prologue to the Ordinatio, that the act of judging a proposition presupposes an apprehension of that proposition. A judgment is expressed by an act of assenting to, or dissenting from, a proposition. Acts of judgment, on the other hand, are only concerned with logical propositions (i.e. pleasure or pain) or of complex objects (e.g. Apprehension may be of simple objects (e.g. Apprehension is an act whereby the intellect becomes aware of an object. Ockham distinguishes between apprehension and judgment as acts of the intellective soul. While the will may, or may not, act on the desires of the sentient soul, the intellective capacity for judgment or understanding may, or may not, act on the desires of the will. In Ockham’s theory of the nature of human volition, the will is the capacity of the intellective soul for acting, or not acting, upon the desires of the sentient soul. The appetites and desires of the sentient soul may be accepted or rejected by the intellective soul. In a human being, the sentient and intellective activities of the soul may be in harmony with each other, or may be in conflict with each other. The sentient soul is capable of physical sensation, but the intellective soul is not capable of physical sensation. 1 A human soul is a composite soul of sentient and intellective power and capability. The sentient soul is the type of soul which belongs to a physical creature (such as an animal), but the intellective or rational soul is the type of soul which belongs to a spiritual creature (such as an angel).

The sentient soul is extended and material, but the intellective soul is non-extended and non-material. Ockham makes a basic distinction between the sentient and intellective soul.

Ockham’s theory of cognition is presented in works such as the Summa Logicae, the Quodlibeta Septem, and the Prologue to the Ordinatio (the Commentary on the First Book of Sentences). He thus had an important influence on modern empiricist philosophy.

In his approach to metaphysics and epistemology, Ockham used a method of logical empiricism, asserting that intuitive knowledge is prior to abstractive knowledge, and that abstractive knowledge must be based on intuitive knowledge. Ockham taught that universal terms are merely names which are attached to particular things, and that universal terms are merely linguistic devices which we use to try to understand reality. In his approach to the philosophy of language, Ockham was an important proponent of nominalism, the doctrine that only particulars, and not universals, are real. His political writings included: Dialogus Inter Magistrum et Discipulum de potestate Papae et Imperatoris (Dialogue between Master and Disciples on the Power of Emperors and Popes, 1334-47), and his Octo quaestiones de potestate papae (Eight Questions on the Power of the Pope, 1340-44). His theological works included: In Libros Sententiarum (Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, 1317-18), and the Quodlibeta Septem (Seven Quodlibets, 1322-25).

His philosophical writings included the Summa Logicae (Summa of Logic, c.1328), the Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis (Exposition of the Books of Physics of Aristotle, 1322-24), and the Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus (Treatise on Predestination and on God's Foreknowledge of Future Contingents, 1321-24). Ockham wrote extensively on many subjects, including logic, epistemology, the philosophy of language, metaphysics, ethics, and theology. He died in the city of Munich (in Bavaria). He was born in the village of Ockham, county of Surrey. William of Ockham (c.1285-c.1349) was an English philosopher, logician, and theologian. William of Ockham, on the Difference between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition

Ockham agent intellect